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Introduction: Fear and
Loathing of Evolutionary
Psychology in the Social
Sciences
Daniel W. Leger
Alan C. Kamil
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Jeffrey A. French
University of Nebraska-Omaha

When one looks at the intellectual landscape of the modern university,
at the scholarly and scientific interests of its faculty, the panorama
is seamless. There are no discontinuities. The interests of physicists
transmogrify into those of chemists, those of chemists into those of
biologists, and so on. The lines, the divisions, between departments
have been created out of administrative, not intellectual, necessity.
For example, consider the divide between chemistry and biology.
There is a set of chemical processes that are characteristic of living
systems. Is the study of these processes chemistry or biology? This is
a meaningless question. To be a really good biochemist, one must be
both a biologist and a chemist. After all, biochemistry is the study of
chemical processes as carried out by biological systems.
Now consider the divide between biology and psychology. Psychological processes are produced by organisms and are the result of
biological systems. The nature of psychological processes, therefore,
must be understood, at least in part, in terms of biology. But biology is a huge, diverse discipline whose subject matter ranges from
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molecules to ecosystems and from the present to the deep past. So to
say that psychological processes need to be understood biologically
is a tall order. However, psychology has long embraced parts of the
biological panorama, namely neurophysiology and endocrinology.
We have organized this symposium in recognition of our belief that
many questions that have interested psychologists can benefit from
contact with other areas of biology, particularly those that deal with
populations over long spans of time: ecology and evolution.
One only need read the newspaper to be aware of the tremendous
advances that are taking place in contemporary biology. At the molecular level, these advances are revealing the power of the information
contained in the four-letter alphabet of DNA. Although we must not
succumb to simple-minded genetic determinism (so common in the
newspaper stories), it is clear that molecular biology will transform
our understanding of many arenas of human existence, including
psychology.
The advances at the level of the whole organism are equally
impressive. The power of the modern synthesis of Darwinian thought
is proving itself again and again. Although sometimes surrounded
by controversy, evolutionary ideas are leading to a revolution in how
we understand the world and our own place in that world. Thus,
evolutionary psychology, defined as the study of psychological topics
in the light of Darwinian ideas, such as natural and sexual selection,
is beginning to have an important influence on our understanding of
psychological processes, an influence that will grow dramatically in
the next 25 years.
The primary reason that this growth will occur is that Darwin was
right when he proposed fundamental continuity between humans
and all other species that exist on earth. Evidence from every level—
DNA, development, morphology, paleontology, behavior—is congruent with this idea. Humans are part of, and must be understood as
part of, the biological world.
Nonetheless, the road to understanding human psychology as
the product of natural selection is rough to say the least. Courtwright
(1996), a historian, summarized this nicely: "The idea that human
behavior is shaped by an underlying animal nature determined by
millions of years of evolution is roughly as popular among contemporary historians as it is among Baptists" (p. 7). We would add
that most psychologists would side with the historians and Bap-
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tists. The antievolutionary sentiments of many social scientists stem
from misunderstandings whose origins reach back to the centuriesold nature/nurture debate. These misunderstandings have acted as
barriers to full acceptance of Darwinian thinking in psychology. Our
goal in this chapter is to briefly describe some of the most common
misunderstandings of evolutionary psychology and to offer remedies
to them.

Five Misunderstandings of Evolutionary Psychology
Although a large majority of psychologists believe in evolution in
general and of the human species in particular, evolutionary psychology has been slow to take root. Moreover, criticisms of evolutionary
psychology are often shrill—reminiscent of the complaints of creationists when addressing evolution in general—which suggests that
there is a "gut level" hostility toward evolutionary psychology that
needs to be understood and tempered before progress can be made.
We believe there are five main reasons why evolutionary psychology
has encountered resistance.
The naturalistic fallacy. Evolution is a natural process, but "natural"
implies wholesome and good. According to this thinking, much about
human behavior that we find objectionable (for example, rape or
infanticide) would have to be condoned if we accept evolutionary
hypotheses of human behavior. This is the kernel of the naturalistic
fallacy. We wish to add our voices to the chorus that eschews the
naturalistic fallacy. We agree with Buss (1995): "The metatheory of
evolutionary psychology is descriptive, not prescriptive—it carries
no values in its teeth" (p. 167). Evolution is neither moral nor immoral.
It is purely pragmatic. That which has worked in the past persists
to the present. But the values that we may attach to natural events
are completely separate. Tornadoes, floods, and earthquakes are all
natural, too, but we do what we can to guard against them and to
minimize the suffering they may cause. Diseases are also natural
and disruptive, so biomedical researchers are working feverishly to
eliminate them. Evolutionary psychologists are sometimes accused
of condoning rape or murder, or of, at least, providing an argument
in the legal defenses of those who commit such crimes. We find it odd
that those scientists who study socially disruptive behaviors from a
traditional social science framework are never accused of "aiding and
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abetting" but that evolutionary psychologists are. Injurious behaviors
must be understood in order to combat them, and evolutionary
analyses can contribute substantially to that understanding.
The study of evolution does not provide grounds for unjust
treatment of individuals. For example, evolutionary psychologists
are often accused of sexism (Travis & Yeager, 1991). But the evolution
of sex differences is widespread in the animal kingdom. The selection
conditions that faced our male human ancestors differed from those
that faced our female human ancestors. Consequently, a host of morphological, physiological, and behavioral differences have evolved
(Geary, 1998). Does this imply that girls and women should be limited
to different paths than those that are made available to boys and men?
No. Given less protection under the law? Certainly not. Treated as
though they are members of a totally disjointed category? Preposterous. The observation that males and females differ quantitatively
on some traits, but do so with much overlap in their distributions,
has been caricatured as meaning that all men differ from all women.
This is absurd. Despite claims that evolutionary psychology is sexist
or racist (Fairchild, 1991), the discipline merely seeks to understand,
not to prop up, deplorable sexist and racist practices and ideologies.
Evolved means inflexible. Many psychologists (and even biologists)
have a mistaken idea of what an evolved behavior looks like. Their
thinking goes something like this: Evolution means genetics and
genetics means reflexive, instinctive behavior. We do not see much
pure instinct in humans, so evolutionary psychology, although perhaps of value for animal studies, is of little value for understanding
humans. Buunk, Angleitner, Oubaid, and Buss (1996) described this
thinking and offered a correction to it: "Evolutionary hypotheses
are sometimes misinterpreted as implying rigid, robotlike, instinctual behavior that suggests that the individual is oblivious to the
social environment. In fact, evolutionary psychology postulates psychological mechanisms that were designed to respond to the social
environment" (p. 363).
The theme of the symposium, motivation, fits nicely into an evolutionary approach to human behavior. What we posit is that natural
selection has led to the evolution of motivational processes, ones that
goad one to action. Actions themselves are often learned and their
expression is situationally flexible. Evolutionary psychology seeks
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to understand these motivational processes as they exist in Homo
sapiens by examining the historical, selective conditions that drove
their evolution into their present forms. Evolutionary psychology is
less concerned with the particular behavioral patterns used in achieving motivated goal states than with the reasons for the motivational
processes themselves.
Evolutionary psychologists have embraced the notion of developmental plasticity and are linking plasticity with its environmental "switches" and underlying genetic mechanisms. Phenotypic
outcomes, including behavior, may vary markedly depending on
environmental conditions. Developmental psychologists, of course,
have been keenly interested in such processes; indeed, psychology
as a whole has staked out the landscape of behavioral plasticity as
its domain. But biologists have also long recognized developmental
plasticity. For example, in many reptiles and other vertebrates an
individual can develop either as a male or as a female, depending on
such environmental conditions as temperature during early development (Bull, 1985). Larval tiger salamanders can develop into one
of two different morphs depending on population density. In highdensity conditions, most individuals become cannibalistic and are
equipped with specialized carnivore-like mouth parts quite different
from those of the low-density morph, which is specialized for eating
small invertebrates (Pfennig & Collins, 1993). Many vertebrates adopt
different mating systems (for example, monogamy versus polyandry)
or parental care patterns (female only, male only, or biparental care)
as a function of such environmental conditions as food abundance
(reviewed by Lott, 1984). Psychologists who think that biology is concerned just with rigid, instinctive, and otherwise inflexible processes
are ignorant of the biology that has developed during the last 40 years.
But surprisingly, there is substantial resistance among psychologists to certain hypothesized cases of developmental flexibility. For
example, recent studies assert that puberty may be accelerated in
girls exposed to unstable and stressful family environments (Belsky,
Steinberg, & Draper, 1991) or to poor relationships with their fathers
(Ellis, McFadyen-Ketchum, Dodge, Pettit, & Bates, 1999). This work
has drawn considerable ire and disbelief despite its solid evidentiary
base and its consistency with comparative findings in life history.
Hypothesized relations between childhood familial environments—
which are admittedly complex and difficult to quantify—and a va-
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riety of human life history strategies are emerging as important in
evolutionary psychology, as well they should. Daly and Wilson's
chapter in this volume, for example, presents evidence that young
men living in economically disadvantaged conditions, especially if
they live near more advantaged individuals, may be especially likely
to take risks, even risks having life-and-death stakes. Their analysis
hints at the operation of flexible developmental outcomes, and they
would certainly agree that analyses of the developmental histories of
the individuals involved would shed much light on the issue of male
violence.
Interestingly, another form of male-initiated violence—rape—
may be sensitive to early family environment (Thornhill & Palmer,
2000). So why do evolutionary accounts of human violence draw
such vicious attacks? After all, violence is being viewed in contexts
that mainstream psychologists have embraced for decades, namely,
flexible, environmentally contingent responses. What is the problem? Probably the naturalistic fallacy. The critics of evolutionary
approaches to violence—whether rape, homicides among men, child
abuse or infanticide—seem to be more concerned with culpability
than with understanding the phenomenon. Again, understanding a
phenomenon is not equivalent to condoning it.
Confusing proximate and ultimate causes. Another common misunderstanding of evolutionary psychology is the mistake of confusing ultimate causes of behavior with proximate causes. Those who
make this error correctly deduce that evolutionary psychology differs
from the rest of psychology by being selectionistic. Indeed, Daly and
Wilson (1999 and this volume) define evolutionary psychology as
the application of selectionist thinking to psychological phenomena.
Unfortunately, some have mistakenly placed the naturally selected
consequences of the behavior as it occurred in previous generations
into the role of proximate motivator of the behaving individual.
For example, sexual intercourse is seen as being motivated by the
desire to have children. But because many people take steps to have
sexual intercourse without having children, the critic claims that
evolutionary psychology cannot be correct. But this is backwards.
The reason why sexual motivation is manifest at all is because of
the reproductive success garnered by ancestral individuals whose
psychologies operated in such a way as to produce sexual motivation.
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The decision not to have children at all, which seems to be especially
common among academics and other highly educated individuals
(Vining, 1986), is similarly regarded as evidence against evolved
psychology. But offspring production is not the proximate motive
for sexual intercourse. Offspring are the consequence of engaging in
sexual intercourse. The fact that recent technologies permit sexual
intercourse without reproduction is no threat to evolutionary psychology, because until very recently obtaining the proximate goal
would have lead to the ultimate consequence.
The nature of adaptation. Evolutionary psychology differs from the
rest of psychology in its application of selectionist thinking. Most
psychologists are comfortable with the environment in its ontogenetic
role, that of influencing and shaping individual development, but
they are not accustomed to identifying the selective role of the environment, that is, the conditions and events that differentially affect
reproductive success. Traffic accidents, diseases, judicially imposed
incarceration, and marital choices are all selective processes to the
extent that they nonrandomly influence reproductive success. As
evolutionists, we are keen on identifying behavioral/psychological
attributes that influence reproductive success. Some forms of these
attributes reduce reproductive success and are therefore said to be
maladaptive, while other forms increase reproductive success and
are said to be adaptive.
But adaptation is a complex concept that is frequently misunderstood. There are three main methods to the study of adaptation
(Caro & Borgerhoff Mulder, 1987). First, we can measure morphological, physiological, or behavioral traits along with fitness (such as
number of surviving offspring) in individuals in contemporaneous
populations. This leads to insights into the current utility of the trait
of interest. But this method tells us nothing of the trait's history. Second, we can investigate the selective history of a trait by employing
comparative methodologies (Harvey & Pagel, 1991). Third, we can
analyze traits themselves to find evidence of "special design." The
notion of special design depends on a "reverse engineering" analysis
of a trait. That is, a trait's attributes are examined in order to generate
hypotheses about what the trait does. For example, noting that pupils
open and close in concert with changes in light intensity leads to hypotheses about visual responses to light. This is an obvious example,

XVI
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVATION

but the ones that we find of interest in evolutionary psychology can
yield to the same basic approach (Pinker, 1997). McClintock's chapter describes women's endocrine responses to a molecule found in
perspiration that can advance or delay the recipient's next menstrual
cycle. Gangestad's chapter claims that women exhibit preferences
for male facial symmetry and even prefer the odors of more symmetrical males, especially when women are most fertile. Applying
reverse engineering to these processes can tell us how they may have
contributed to reproductive success in previous generations.
However, we must note that the reverse engineering approach
does not test the assumption of adaptation. Furthermore, it is most
useful where the natural history of the species under study is well
known, which may never be the case for Homo sapiens. We suspect
that the most important challenge facing evolutionary psychology is
the development of methods to rigorously test hypotheses about the
evolutionary history and adaptive significance of specific traits.
Misconstruals of adaptation have been used by critics in an effort
to undermine evolutionary interpretations of human behavior. First,
adaptation has been misunderstood to mean that all individuals
should be adapted, meaning that their behavior should contribute to
survival and reproductive success. The failure to behave adaptively is
seen as evidence against evolutionary views. Such reasoning is faulty.
Individual maladaptation may result from several causes, including
developmental errors. Brains are complex structures and they are
subject to the vagaries of complex construction. No one claims that
the heart is not adapted for pumping blood on the grounds that
valves are sometimes misshapen and therefore maladaptive. So why
should we conclude that psychological processes are not evolved and
(generally) adaptive for their bearers even though some individuals
may be psychologically maladapted?
Second, current selective environments often differ from those
that existed during most of the history of the trait. Adaptation results from previous generations of individuals interacting with their
selective environments. But if the selective environment in those
generations differed from those now, we might find that typical individuals alive today demonstrate maladaptations. For instance, our
tastes for certain foods—sugar, salt, fat—may contribute to various
health problems, but these tastes evolved in earlier times when such
diets were not as readily obtained as they are now and when few
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people led sedentary lives. Although there is no doubt that some
individuals possess characteristics that make them less fit than others,
the question of whether or not the environments in which most people
live today are generally ill suited to typical phenotypes is debatable.
With a global population rapidly approaching six billion, it looks
as though our current environments are quite congenial to our traits.
Certainly, there is mortality associated with overindulgence, but most
of it occurs in postreproductive years and therefore is only weakly
selected against. Certainly there are many unhappy people in the
world, but there is no way of knowing whether they would have been
happier in a forager lifestyle, and in either case, natural selection is
not about happiness; it is about reproductive success.
Another complaint that is directed at evolutionary psychology
concerns the evolutionary history of the behavior of interest. Those
who seem most hostile to evolutionary thinking (for example, Eagly &
Wood, 1999) point to inconsistencies and disagreements among evolutionary biologists regarding the nature of adaptation. First among
these is the difference between traits whose original function was
the same as its current function versus those traits whose function
has changed. The former are termed adaptations and the latter are
exaptations. Natural selection has given rise to both. An exaptation is
merely an adaptation whose function has changed.
Another distinction is between adaptation/exaptation and incidental by-products of selection. Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske,
and Wakefield (1998) have written a wonderfully clear exposition of
these concepts. A by-product is a phenotypic feature that itself is not
associated with reproductive success but which is present because of
some other feature which is. Buss et al. give the example of the human
navel as a nonadaptive by-product of the adaptive umbilicus. The
rumbling sounds of digestive systems doing their work is another
example. In behavioral or psychological terms, remembering telephone numbers may be a by-product of naturally selected, adaptive
memory processes, and driving a car is a by-product of a host of
adaptive perceptual and motor skills that evolved for very different
applications.
It is important to note that natural selection has operated in all
of these cases, either producing the adaptive (or exaptive) feature
or the feature that has spun off the by-product. The error made by
antievolutionists is in thinking that if a phenotypic feature is not an
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adaptation (in the strict sense of the term), then it is not evolved. This
is critical for evolutionary psychology because what we hypothesize
to have evolved are mental modules (cognitive, motivational, and
emotional operations; see Gigerenzer, this volume), but not specific
behavioral outputs. So, for example, young men might attempt to
impress young women by showing off their material possessions or
social status. The fact that they do so by driving up in a shiny new car
or by bragging about their promotion at work is simply the expression
of this evolved psychological process in its current cultural context.
Analyses of evolved behavior operating in a very new environmental
context is fundamentally no different from noting that heart rate
increases while climbing a long flight of stairs (instead of chasing
mobile prey) or that the vestibular system maintains balance while
one is rounding a corner in a car (instead of turning around to evade a
predator). In other words, we put to use all manner of traits in dealing
with recently encountered environmental conditions. Psychological
traits are no different from morphological or physiological traits in
this regard.
The study of evolutionary adaptation has also provided useful
insights into the origins and etiology of significant psychological
disorders. From the perspective of the traditional biomedical model,
disorders such as depression, anxiety, schizophrenia, and substance
abuse and addiction are viewed as pathologies, and certainly as
maladaptive behaviors, at least from the perspective of the functioning of a single individual. However, the application of evolutionary
analyses to these phenomena has yielded further insights into these
psychological states. These insights include information regarding
the proximate mechanisms underlying the pathological disorders,
and the potential selective environments that lead to their expression,
and those that may be promoting the maintenance and elaboration
of these traits in current populations (McGuire, Marks, Nesse, &
Troisi, 1992; Nesse & Berridge, 1997; Nesse 1999; Nesse, this volume).
Further, these analyses also suggest the ways in which some states
that are considered to be pathological according to the biomedical
model may simply reflect by-products of selection for other traits
(for example, Crow, 1995,1997).
An interesting task confronting evolutionary psychologists is
determining whether a trait is now a "spandrel," a feature that originated as a by-product but which is currently correlated with repro-
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ductive success (Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Buss et al., 1998). Apossible
example is reading and writing, both of which are recent in human
history and undoubtedly arose as by-products of spoken language,
visual acuity, and manual dexterity. Are reading and writing still byproducts or have they become spandrels? In other words, are reading
and writing correlated with reproductive success? In modern, selective environments they probably are, but that discussion would lead
us astray from our main point: Regardless of whether the phenotypic
feature is or was adaptive, and if so, whether its function has changed,
the phenotypic feature is still evolved.
But there is one issue regarding adaptation that we still need
to address, and it concerns the human mind and whether human
mental processes are the by-products of selection, which have not
yet been selected, or whether these processes have undergone direct
selection. If they have been selected, then we expect to find evidence
of "special design," the notion that selection results in efficiencies,
functional specializations, speed, precision, and so on, that would
not be expected if the trait were merely a by-product. These issues
are addressed in the next section.
The general-purpose mind. The final reason why some psychologists have not embraced evolutionary concepts is a pervasive misunderstanding of what evolution has wrought. Although most psychologists are not creationists, they are social scientists, and acceptance of
what is often called the "traditional social science model" is pervasive
indeed. The basic tenet of the model is that natural selection of
humans has produced a sophisticated problem-solving device, the
human brain/mind, whose abilities are capacious but which depend
on individual experience for their expression. Further, this device can
be brought to bear on myriad diverse problems, ranging from the
intricacies of social dynamics (Seyfarth & Cheney, this volume), to
mathematical problem solving, to strategizing in sports and games,
and planning what to wear to work. What evolution has wrought,
therefore, is so unconstrained in its use that it has curtailed further
evolution! This device has permitted us to shape our environments
to suit our needs, rather than us being selected by our environments.
In brief, most social scientists seem to acknowledge human evolution
while at the same time declaring it irrelevant.
This widely held position regarding the place of evolution within
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modern psychology deserves careful consideration. Its rebuttal is one
of the major themes running through the chapters of this symposium.
To what extent is human psychology dependent on a flexible generalpurpose cognitive device as opposed to a (large) number of more
specific devices? Further, how would we know which view is more
likely to be correct?
One way of approaching the problem is neuropsychologically. If
the human brain / mind is indeed a general-purpose device, we would
expect losses of function to be diffuse when the device becomes damaged, as through injury or stroke. In contrast, if there are numerous,
highly specialized devices, one would expect losses to be much more
restricted. Neuropsychological data clearly support the multipledevices view. Aphasias, for example, not only take the forms of the
classic expressive (Broca's) and receptive (Wernicke's) forms but of
even more singular losses of function, such as the inability to generate
nouns while other parts of speech remain intact; or the inability to
use common nouns even though proper nouns are used normally
(Gazzaniga, 1989). We would not expect to find facial agnosia—the
loss of ability to recognize familiar people by facial features alone—if
facial recognition was but one of many processes controlled by the
general-purpose device.
Studies of nonclinical brain processes are also supporting the
multiple-device view of brain organization. The recent finding that
second languages learned after early childhood utilize brain tissue
distant from that which is most active in the native language (Kim,
Relkin, Lee, & Hirsch, 1997) is an interesting example of this approach.
Noninvasive imaging techniques are becoming more commonly used
by cognitive neuroscientists, and we expect that the trend toward
more precise localization of function will continue.
But evolutionary psychologists are behavioral scientists, and it is
from studies of behavior that most of our insights (and controversies)
are generated. What do we look for in patterns of behavior that would
distinguish between the general-purpose and multiple-specializeddevices views of human behavior? This question has parallels to
those asked about learning processes beginning in the 1960s when
"preparedness" began to be recognized. In short, if a single process
is at work, we expect uniformity in the performance of the system.
We would not expect to find some tasks that are inordinately easy (or
difficult) to learn or remember. We would not expect to find marked
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changes in performance when the content of a problem-solving task
switches from ecologically neutral to ecologically relevant.
The recognition and appreciation of numerous, domain-specific
devices is a trend with a long history in psychology. Most of the
early work along these lines concerned learning. Is learning a general
process, or is it, as Shettleworth (1993), Kamil (1988), and others have
argued, a box of tools, each of which is specialized for performing
certain tasks? Closely related ideas have been voiced by Sherry and
Schacter (1987), who have made a convincing case that multiple memory systems have evolved with properties that make each one quite
adept at one task (for example, remembering song features in birds)
or another (remembering the locations of food caches), but not both.
Finally, cognitive psychologists have widely embraced the notion that
intelligence is not a single capacity, but several (Sternberg, 1985). In
sum, the specialized, modular organization of cognitive systems that
is being advocated by evolutionary psychologists is consistent with a
trend that has been underway in mainstream psychology for at least
40 years.
In conclusion, we have discussed five misunderstandings that
have acted as obstacles to widespread acceptance of evolutionary,
selectionist thinking in modern psychology. All five persist because
some psychologists seem threatened by this "new" way of thinking.
But there is nothing to fear. Studies of development and of proximate
mechanisms—the historical core of psychological research—will not
and should not go away. Rather, they will now be cast into a broader,
richer framework, one whose history goes back much further than
that of the behaving individual's life span. We will see, for example,
why certain developmental processes are favored in some selective
environmental contexts but not in others. We will see that environmentally contingent phenotypic plasticity is not unique to our species
and that such flexibility tends to occur in specific conditions. We will
see that the foibles of human cognition make perfect sense when cognitive processes are viewed as the products of the selection problems
that faced ancestral humans. In short, evolutionary psychology takes
nothing away from traditional psychology. Instead, it adds bridges to
other disciplines that also wish to understand the human condition.
Evolutionary psychology is here to stay. Its principles and findings are appearing in many recent books dealing with such topics
as parental behavior (Hrdy, 1999), sex differences in behavior (Low,

XXII
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVATION

1999), the operations of multiple cognitive processes (Pinker, 1997),
rape (Thornhill & Palmer, 2000), and many others. We believe the
contributions to this symposium will take the field forward another
step and hopefully introduce many to this emerging and exciting
discipline.
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